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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JULIETTE TURLEY,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

Case No. 970020-CA

vs.

:

Oral Argument
Priority 15

ROBERT WALTERS TURLEY,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

:

JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(i) (1996). The final judgment was entered December 4,
1996. (R. 190-83.l)

Mr. Turley filed his notice of appeal 30 days

later, on January 3, 1997. (R. 194-93.)

The notice of appeal was

filed within 3 0 days of the entry of judgment and was therefore
timely.

Utah R. App. P. 4(a).
ISSUES PRESENTED

1.

Where a divorce decree acknowledges the possibility that

an obligor may lose his job but orders child support and alimony
based on the current employment and provides that the child support
and alimony will continue at those levels only so long as the
obligor's income does not change, does the actual occurrence of the

1

The documents in the trial court file are assembled in
reverse chronological order. As a result, the pagination on each
document is in reverse numerical order.

job loss constitute a change of circumstance justifying modification of the child support and alimony?
2.

Where a divorce decree provides that "in the event the

defendant's income does not terminate, the amounts paid for child
support shall continue

, does the support obligation

terminate when the income terminates?
Although an appellate court typically "reviews a trial court's
modification determination for an abuse of discretion," Hill v.
Hill. 841 P.2d 722, 724 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), the trial court's
determination in this case involves solely an interpretation of the
wording of the decree of divorce.

The trial court treated the

issue as having been presented by a motion for summary judgment.
(R. 158.) The only issues presented involve the interpretation of
the decree.

"Since appellate courts are in as good a position as

trial courts to interpret court rulings . . . , [this court] should
review the trial court's interpretation of its order for correctness."

Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 346 (Utah 1996).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS

Appellant is not aware of any constitutional provisions,
statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations whose interpretation is
determinative of the appeal.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature Of The Case. This is an appeal from a final order

dismissing

appellants

petition

for modification

of a divorce

decree.
B.

Course Of Proceedings And Disposition Below. The parties

were divorced by a decree entered February 9, 1996.

(R. 95-88.)

On May 30, 1996, Mr. Turley filed his Verified Petition to Amend
Decree of Divorce.

(R. 122-119.)

October 10, 1996.

A trial on the petition was held

(R. 159-58.)

At the conclusion of trial,

however, the parties stipulated that there was only one factual
issue (a $1,400.00 payment which is not at issue on this appeal),
and agreed that Mrs. Turley's trial memorandum could be treated as
a memorandum supporting summary judgment.

(R. 158.)

Mr. Turley

responded to the "memorandum for summary judgment" (R. 168-64), and
Mrs. Turley replied.

(R. 173-69.)

The trial court entered its Memorandum Decision on November
15, 1996, finding the issues in favor of Mrs. Turley.
On December 4, 1996, the court entered

(R. 182-77.)

its Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Order granting Mrs. Turley 7 s motion for
summary judgment and dismissing Mr. Turley's petition for modification.

(R. 190-83.)
C.

Statement of Facts.

On September 28, 1994, after 27

years of marriage, Mrs. Turley filed a complaint seeking a divorce
from Mr. Turley.

(R. 7-1.)

At that time, Mr. Turley was employed

3

as President and CEO of Intermountain Farmers Association, but that
position

was

terminated

effective

August

1,

1995.

(R.

65.)

Pursuant to his employment agreement with IFA, Mr. Turley's full
income of $12 3,198.00 per year continued through May 31, 1996, and
IFA and Mr. Turley had tentatively contemplated ongoing compensation of one-fourth of that amount for four years.

(Id.)

The divorce case was set for trial December 14, 1995, but the
parties reached a stipulation which was approved by the court.

(R.

85.)

stipulation

and

granting the decree of divorce were entered February 9, 1996.

(R.

The

formal

documents

implementing

the

95-88, 103-96.)
Paragraph 7 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
entered

in

connection

with

the divorce

acknowledged

Turley's income would terminate:
The defendant has represented to the
Court that his income with Intermountain
Farmers will terminate on May 31, 1996, at
which time he will no longer receive income
from Intermountain Farmers; however, it is
reasonable that in the event the defendant's
income does not terminate, the amounts paid
for child support and alimony shall continue
as set forth above. In the event the defendant's income, which has historically been
$181,000.00 per year, should be that amount,
and whether he is employed with Intermountain
Farmers Association or any other company, or
has income in said amount, then alimony paid
by the defendant to the plaintiff shall
increase in the amount that child support
decreases when the minor children reach their
majority, but only so long as the defendant's
income is based upon historical earnings of
$181,000.00 per year.
(R. 101.)
4

that Mr.

The

Decree

of

Divorce

similarly

termination of Mr. Turley's income.

noted

the

anticipated

Paragraph 3 of the decree

ordered Mr. Turley to pay $1,300.00 per month as support for the
two

minor

children.

Paragraph

$1,500.00 per month as alimony.

4

ordered

(R. 94.)

Mr. Turley

to

pay

Paragraph 7 of the

decree made those payments conditional on Mr. Turley7s continued
employment:
The defendant's income from Intermountain
Farmers will terminate on May 31, 1996, at
which time he will no longer receive income
from Intermountain Farmers; however, in the
event
the
defendant's
income
does
not
terminate, the amounts paid for child support
shall continue as set forth above.
With
respect to alimony, alimony shall increase in
the amount that child support decreases when
the minor children reach their majority, only
so long as the defendant's income is based
upon historical earnings of $181,000.00 per
year.
(R. 93.)
The $9,583.00 per month Mr. Turley was receiving from IFA did
terminate effective May 31, 1996.

(R. 124.)

Mr. Turley attempted

to find other work, but at the time he filed his petition to
modify, he was only earning approximately
(Id.)

$1,000.00 per month.

The trial court denied his requested modification, and Mr.

Turley thereafter perfected this appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The parties' divorce decree noted that Mr. Turley's income
would

terminate only a few months after entry of the decree.

Rather than attempting to predict the future, the divorce decree

made an award of alimony and child support based on Mr. Turley's
then current income and provided that the alimony and child support
would

continue

at

those

levels

until

the

income

terminated.

Implied in the decree was the expectation that a modification would
need to occur when Mr. Turley's post-IFA income became known.
The

trial

court

dismissed

Mr.

Turley's

petition

for

modification based on the rule that a decree may be modified only
upon

proof

of

a

substantial

change

in

circumstances

not

contemplated at the time of the decree. Although Mr. Turley's loss
of income was known at the time of the decree, the decree did not
contemplate or account for the actual level of the reduced income.
The decree must be read to give effect to all of its terms.

Those

terms include provisions that the alimony and child support will
continue only so long as Mr. Turley's income continued at the IFA
levels.

The only

internally

consistent

interpretation

of the

divorce decree is that the divorce decree anticipated the need for
a future hearing after Mr. Turley's income became known.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
MR. TURLEY'S INABILITY TO EARN HIS PRIOR
LEVEL OF INCOME WAS NOT A CIRCUMSTANCE
CONTEMPLATED BY THE DECREE OF DIVORCE,
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (1995) vests a divorce court with
"continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders
for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the

6

children and their support . . . as is reasonable and necessary."
A

prerequisite

to

invoking

the

divorce

court's

continuing

jurisdiction is proof of "a substantial change of circumstances
subsequent to the decree, that was not originally contemplated
within the decree itself." Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393, 394
(Utah 1985) . The trial court employed this principle to hold that
because Mr. Turley's potential loss of income was known and in fact
stated in the decree of divorce, Mr. Turley must continue to pay
$2,800.00 in child support and alimony as though he were earning
over $9,000.00 per month, although his current income is around
$1,000.00 per month.

This

is obviously

not fair nor was it

contemplated by the parties or the court at the time of the divorce
decree.
The understanding of the parties and the divorce court is best
represented in paragraph 7 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, which states:
The defendant has represented to the
Court that his income with Intermountain
Farmers will terminate on May 31, 1996, at
which time he will no longer receive income
from Intermountain Farmers; however, it is
reasonable that in the event the defendant's
income does not terminate, the amounts paid
for child support and alimony shall continue
as set forth above. In the event the defendant's income, which has historically been
$181,000.00 per year, should be that amount,
and whether he is employed with Intermountain
Farmers Association or any other company, or
has income in said amount, then alimony paid
by the defendant to the plaintiff shall
increase in the amount that child support
decreases when the minor children reach their
majority, but only so long as the defendant's
7

income is based upon historical earnings of
$181,000.00 per year.
(R. 101.)
In other words, the divorce court noted the probable future
loss of income, but declined to forecast the future and explicitly
decided only what support would be based on present income.
approach is consistent with Utah law.

This

In MacLean v. MacLean. 523

P.2d 862 (Utah 1974), the trial court anticipated that the wife
would gain employment and that her need
reduced.

for alimony would

be

The trial court attempted to anticipate the probable

employment by reducing alimony 5% each year.

The Utah Supreme

Court rejected such an attempt to divine the future and counseled:
"We deem it best that the changes in alimony either downward or
upward should be left to future determinations by the court under
its continuing jurisdiction."

523 P.2d at 863.

The divorce court in the instant matter did just what the
MacLean court advised.

The court set alimony and child support

based on the only facts which were known, which was the income at
the time of the decree.

The court also specifically stated that

these amounts would continue only so long as the income continued.
The decisions relied upon by the trial court and Mrs. Turley
below do not support the dismissal of Mr. Turley's petition to
modify.

In Durfee v. Durfee, 796 P.2d 713 (Utah Ct. App. 1990),

the trial court found that the husband's income had increased by
$16,000.00 over the ten years following the divorce.
characterized

the

increase as modest
8

and

argued

The husband

that such

an

increase would have been clearly "contemplated" by the parties at
the time of the decree.

The Court of Appeals rejected

that

argument and stated:
The fact that the parties may have anticipated
an increase of income in their own minds or in
their discussions does not mean that the
decree itself contemplates the change.
In
order for a material change in circumstances
to be contemplated in a divorce decree, there
must be evidence, preferably in the form of a
provision within the decree itself, that the
trial court anticipated the specific change.
796 P.2d at 716.

The Durfee court illustrated this quotation by

citation to Dana v. Dana, 789 P.2d 726 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

In

that case, the trial court anticipated that the wife, who earned
$3,000.00

the

year

prior

to

the

divorce,

would

soon

earn

approximately $10,000.00 to $12,000.00 per year in gross income.
Four

years

after

the

divorce, the wife

$17,000.00 per year in gross income.

actually

was

earning

The Court of Appeals held

that because part of this increase was contemplated at the time of
the divorce, the actual increased income was only $5,000.00 to
$7,000.00 for purposes of determining whether a substantial change
in circumstances had occurred.

789 P.2d at 729.

These cases actually support Mr. Turley's position.

The rule

established by these cases is that where a trial court makes a
support order which

is

intended

to

account

for

anticipated future

changes, the actual occurrence of those anticipated changes will
not constitute a "substantial change of circumstances." The decree

9

in the instant case did not "contemplate" the loss by making a
support order which would account for the future income loss.
Moore v. Moore, 872 P.2d 1054 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), also fails
to support the position of Mrs. Turley in the trial court below.
The court held in that case that the initial support amounts were
set based on an expectation that the wife would soon be employed as
a school teacher.

The court accordingly held that the wife's

actually obtaining that employment was not a substantial change in
circumstances.2
The decree in the instant case expressly acknowledges that Mr.
Turley's income from his then current employer would end, but the
parties did not know nor did the divorce court forecast what his
income would be thereafter.
contemplate

fore,

or

The divorce decree does not, there-

account

for the future

income.

To

the

contrary, the decree expressly contemplates income at the level of
the decree.

Mr. Turley does not now earn that level of income, and

the trial court's order dismissing his petition to modify the
decree must be reversed.

2

Part of the rationale of Moore squarely conflicts with the
holding in Durfee. The Moore court based its holding on evidence
that "[a]t the time the decree was entered, the parties had
discussed Mrs. Moore's plan to recertify as a school teacher or to
obtain a Master's degree in sociology." 872 P.2d at 1055 (underlining added).
In Durfee, the court disapproved relying on the
parties' discussions. The Durfee court stated: "The fact that the
parties may have anticipated an increase of income in their own
minds or in their discussions does not mean that the decree itself
contemplates the change." 796 P.2d at 716.
10
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Paragraph 7 of the decree provides that the child support shall
continue "in the event the defendants income does not terminate."
The corollary of the statement is that the child support will not
continue if defendant7s income terminated.

While not as clear as

for child support, the same paragraph also indicates that ongoing
alimony

is

contingent

upon

defendant's

income

remaining

at

$181,000.00 per year.
Any
dispelled
findings.

uncertainty

in the

intent

by reference to paragraph

of

the

divorce

decree

7 of the divorce

is

court's

(R. 101, quoted above in the Statement of Facts.)

If

the decree contemplates what Mrs. Turley claims, that Mr. Turley's
$2,800 monthly support obligation was to continue even after he
lost his income, then the findings do not support the decree.

The

findings unambiguously state that "it is reasonable that in the
event defendant's income does not terminate, the amounts paid for
child support and alimony shall continue as set forth above."

This

Court should reject any interpretation of the decree which causes
to decree to be unsupported by the findings.
The only interpretation of the divorce decree which gives
effect to all of its terms and which makes sense in light of the
findings is that the support obligations were to continue only so
long as Mr. Turley continued to earn $181,000.00 per year.
income stream has now ended.

That

Mr. Turley is now entitled to a

reduction of his support obligations commensurate with his current
income.

12
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DATED th 1

LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this 18th
day of April, 1997.
Rosemond G. Blakelock, Esq.
Blakelock & Stringer
3 7 East Center, 2nd Floor
Provo, UT 84606
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APPENDIX "A"
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
(R. 190-183)

tiftf*

*•'£

*fi

-if

Rosemond Blakelock #6183
BLAKELOCK AND STRINGER, P.A.
Attorney(s) for Plaintiff
37 East Center, 2nd Floor
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801) 375-7678
I N T H EF 0 U R T H

%

•

^r>^cmxE) nf^i
G'^fifs

DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
*
*

JULIETTE TIJ RI E !:n! ,

*

Plaintiff,

FJNiJiNl

11 IK F A C T ,

I:ON«!..1JJUXUMJ

O F LAW AND

UNDER

v.
*

ROBERT WALTERS TURLEY,

Case No. 944402269

Defendant.

*
*

Judge Howard Maetani

This matter came before the Court for trial — October 1 0,
1996.

Plaintiff Juliette Turley was present

epresented by
>*s

counsel Rosemond c-sL^e-u/
present and represented by counsel jr

Petersen.

The Court granted *-^ ^=.*-i--^c - ^%/- • r> submit their proposed
Findings
replies.

t
No Findings

Fact ana Conclusion^

ui ^a*

*eie

submitted. However, Defendant submitted a Memorandum in Opposition
I 11

II1 I ni i i l l i I II

I I I ni i HI

I i mi

iiHIIiiiii 11 ,

h n i q o m e i l II::

and Plaintiff submitted a response to Defendant

,

Memorandum

i

Opposition, to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment: on October
28,

1996

IE ] • i I i : ! :::, i II: Ill: I .1 ,

I::

• • • l a i : t: .er befor e

October 28, 1996, i fhun Plaintiff fi;ed a Motion to Submit.
The Court having heard the testimony of witnesses, considered

the exhibits and arguments of counsel, reviewed the submitted
documents, and being fully advised in the premises, now makes the
following:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The Court finds that the Plaintiff and Defendant were
divorced on February 9, 1996.
2. The Court finds that the divorce was granted pursuant to
stipulation.
3. The Court finds that paragraph 4 of the Divorce Decree sets
out that the Defendant is to pay the Plaintiff alimony in the sum
of $1,500*00 per month for the Plaintiff's support and maintenance,
the sum is to be paid in semi-monthly installments of $750.00 each
to be paid on the 5th and 20th of each month.
4. The Court finds that paragraph 3 of the divorce decree sets
out that the Defendant is to pay the Plaintiff child support in the
sum of $1,300*00 per month for support and maintenance of the two
minor children.

Child support is to continue until the minor

children reach the age of 18 years of graduate from high school
with their normal matriculated class, whichever occurs last.
5. The Court finds that paragraph 7 of the divorce decree
states:
The defendant's income from Intermountain Farmers will
terminate on May 31, 1996, at which time he will no longer
receive income from Intermountain farmers; however, in the
event the defendant's income does not terminate, the amounts
paid for child support shall continue as set forth above. With
respect to alimony, alimony shall increase-in the amount that
child support decreases when the minor children reach their
majority, only so long as the defendant's income is based upon

hlS"LL
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"he Court finds thar the Defendant uas applied to modify

the amount of alimony.

Based upon the forgoing Findings of Fact the Court now ma kes

the following;
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substantial change of circumstance, the Court must also determine
:ange of circumstance was contemplated at the time of the
uxvwfce decree.
I The decree of divorce specifically states:
The defendant's income from, Intermountain Farmers will
terminate on May 31, 1996, at which time he will no longer

receive income from Intermountain farmers; however, in the
event the defendant's income doe not terminate, the amounts
paid for child support shall continue as set forth above. With
respect to alimony, alimony shall increase in the amount that
child support decreases when the minor children reach their
majority, only so long as the defendant's income is based upon
historical earnings of $181,000.00 per year.
The language of the divorce decree' is plain on it's face. The
parties did contemplate the fact that the Defendant could lose his
income from Intermaountain Farmers.

Paragraph 7 of the divorce

decree specifically addresses this contingency.

It states that if

the Defendant's income does not terminate, that the child support
will continue as set out in the decree.

The divorce decree at

paragraph 7 states that Plaintiff's income from Intermountain
Farmers will terminate on May 31, 1996. This statement is clear
evidence that the parties knew the Plaintiff would lose his
employment.
This paragraph when taken in whole plainly indicates the fact
the Defendant would lose his income from Intermountain Farmers was
contemplated and contingencies for child support were included in
the document.

Paragraph 7 particularly explicitly refers to the

termination of his employment, yet there is nothing in the decree
indicating

agreement

to

alter

alimony

when

this

happened.

Defendant argues that paragraph 7 contemplates a reduction in child
support upon termination of the employment. Defendant argues that
the language indicating that child support would not decrease
indicates

an

termination
farmers.

agreement

of

to

reduce

the Defendant's

the

child

support on

employment with

the

Intermountain

The fact that child support may or may not have been

anticipated as being modified is not dispositive in this case. The

alimony

and child

paragraphs.
In 1
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support

provisions

are handled

T h e C o u r t t h e r e f o r e m u s t a d d r e s s them separately. T h e
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ihange was
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The Court
Moore's

employment and stabie
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the
to

say:
rji^Q £ a c t that Mrs. Moor e presently has a s table income cannot
be considered a change in circumstances, The parties obviously
contemplated that Mrs. Moore would earn approximately $ 1300
at the time the divorce decree was entered. Mrs. Moore's
stable level of income was anticipated at the time of the
divorce when the original alimony award was set. Thus, the
court incorrectly determined that Mrs. Moore's present* ^t-able
income was a substantial change in her material
circumstances.
In sum, the court's findings do not support a determination
that a substantial change in material circumstances not
contemplated at the time of the entry of the original decree
has occurred. We therefore reverse the court's determination
of a substantial change in circumstances and remand for a
reinstatement of the original $ 1050 alimony award.
The case at bar is similar in that the parties obviously knew
the Plaintiff's employment was going to terminate in May and knew
Thi :i s

• =!! si I t
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ai i I::::i • :::::! pated

contemplated DV the parties yet they did nui 'cake account of this
in setting alimony.

and

6. In addition, the Court in Moore faced an issue of child
support. The divorce decree said that the child support obligation
ceased when the children reached majority. Mr. Moore petitioned to
terminate the alimony obligation because the children had all
become emancipated and Mrs. Moore had a stable income.

The Utah

Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of whether a child
reaching majority constituted a substantial change in circumstances
saying, "It was certainly a circumstance that was contemplated at
the time the decree was entered, id. at 1055. This Court therefore
does

not decide

if

the

change

in Defendant's

income

is a

substantial, material change in circumstances as this change was
undoubtedly

contemplated

at the time the divorce decree was

entered.
7. For the above stated reasons, the Court finds no grounds
for

modification

of

the

divorce

decree

based

on

changed

circumstances contemplated at the time the divorce decree was
entered. The divorce decree explicitly refers to the fact that the
Defendant would lose his income from Intermountain Farmers. Thus
the Court cannot now alter the decree.
8. Each party should pay their own attorney's fees and costs
in this matter.

BASED upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, and for good cause appearing, the Court issues the following;

ORDER

and

1.

The Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted,

the

Petition

for Modification

is hereby

dismissed

with

prejudice.
2. The Court cannot now alter the decree of divorce,
3. Each party shall pay their own attorney's fees and costs in
this matter.

DATED this

A.

day of

^ ^ ^ ^ ^ y .

OUHi

1996.

,0

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Don R. Petersen, Esq.

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY
TO: Don Petersen
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84606
You will please take notice that he undersigned attorney for
Plaintiff will submit the above and foregoing Order to the
Honorable Howard Maetani for his signature, upon the expiration of
five (5) days from the date of this Notice, plus three (3) days for
mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that time,
pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial Administration of
the State of UtahDATED this

1996,

JSEMOND G^BLAKELOCK
Attorney fW-Plaintiff

APPENDIX "B"
Memorandum Decision
(R. 182-177)

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Coun
Utah County, State of Utah.
CARMA 8. SMITH, Clerk

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURI ~^
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

7Z

JULIETTE TURLEY,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,
V.

ROBERT WALTERS TURLEY,

Case No. 944402269
Judge Howard H. Maetani

Defendant.

This matter came before the Court for trial on October 10, 1996. Plaintiff Juliette
Turley was present and represented by counsel Rosemond Blakelock. Defendant Robert
Walters Turley was present and represented by counsel Don R. Petersen.
The Court granted the parties 10 days to submit their proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and 5 days to submit replies. No Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law were submitted. However, Defendant submitted a Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgement on October 23, 1996 and Plaintiff submitted a
response to Defendants Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgement on October 28, 1996. Plaintiff then brought the matter before the court on
October 28, 1996 when Plaintiff filed a Motion to Submit.
The Court, having heard the testimony of witnesses, considered the exhibits and
arguments of counsel, reviewed the submitted documents, and being fully advised in the
premises now makes the following:

^ D5ni:r

Memorandum Decision
Findings of Fact
1.

The Plaintiff and Defendant were divorced on February 9, 1996.

2.

The divorce was granted pursuant to stipulation.

3.

Paragraph 4 of the divorce decree sets out that the Defendant is to pay the

Plaintiff alimony in the sum of $1,500.00 per month for the Plaintiffs support and
maintenance. This sum is to be paid in semi-monthly installments of $750.00 each to be paid
on the 5th and 20th days of each month.
4. Paragraph 3 of the divorce decree sets out that the Defendant is to pay to the
Plaintiff child support in the sum of $1,300.00 per month for support and maintenance of the
two minor children. Child support is to continue until the minor children reach the age of 18
years or graduate from high school with their normal matriculated class, whichever occurs
last
5.

Paragraph 7 of the divorce decree states:

The defendant's income from Intermountain Fanners will terminate on May 31, 1996,
at which time he will no longer receive income from Intermountain Farmers; however,
in the event the defendant's income does not terminate, the amounts paid for child
support shall continue as set forth above. With respect to alimony, alimony shall
increase in the amount that child support decreases when the minor children reach
their majority, only so long as the defendant's income is based upon historical
earnings of $181,000.00 per year.
6.

Defendant has applied to modify the amount of alimony.

Conclusions of Law
1.

This Court has jurisdiction over the parties to this action and over the subject

matter of this action.

2.

The Court has "continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new

orders for the support and maintenance of the parties. Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(3).
3.

Concerning the circumstances under which a court may modify a divorce

decree, the Utah Court of Appeals stated, "On a petition for a modification of a divorce
decree, the threshold requirement for relief is a showing of substantial change of
circumstances occurring since the entry of the decree and not contemplated in the decree
itself." Durfee v. Durfee, 796 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah App. 1990)(quoting Stealer v. Stealer,
713 P.2d 699, 701 (Utah 1985). Therefore, in addition to finding there was a substantial
change of circumstance, the Court must also determine if the change of circumstance was
contemplated at the time of the divorce decree.
4.

The decree of divorce specifically states:

The defendant's income from Intermountain Farmers will terminate on May 31, 1996,
at which time he will no longer receive income from Intermountain Farmers; however,
in the event the defendant's^ income does not terminate, the amounts paid for child
support shall continue as set forth above. With respect to alimony, alimony shall
increase in the amount that child support decreases when the minor children reach
their majority, only so long as the defendant's income is based upon historical
earnings of $181,000.00 per year.
The language of the divorce decree is plain on its face. The parties did contemplate
the fact the Defendant could lose his income from Intermountain Farmers. Paragraph 7 of the
divorce decree specifically addresses this contingency. It states that if the Defendant's
income does not terminate, that the child support will continue as set out in the decree. The
divorce decree in paragraph 7 states that Plaintiffs income from Intermountain Farmers will
terminate on May 31, 1996. This statement is clear evidence that the parties knew the
Plaintiff would lose his employment.
This paragraph when taken in whole plainly indicates the fact the Defendant would

lose his income from Intermountain Farmers was contemplated and contingencies for child
support were included in the document

Paragraph 7 particularly explicitly refers to the

termination of his employment, yet there is nothing in the decree indicating agreement to alter
alimony when this happened Defendant argues that paragraph 7 contemplates a reduction m
child support upon termination of the employment Defendant argues that the language
indicating that child support would not decrease indicates an agreement to reduce the child
support on the termination of Defendant's employment with Intermountain Farmers The fact
that child support may or may not have been anticipated as being modified is not dispositive
in this case The alimony and child support provisions are handled in separate paragraphs
The Court therefore must address them separately The fact that a reduction in child support
may have been anticipated does not affect the question of alimony See Moore v Moore, 872
P2d 1054, 1055-56 (Utah App 1994)
5.

In Moore v Moore, the Utah Court of Appeals held that a change in income is

not a substantial change in circumstances if the change was anticipated at the time the divorce
decree was entered The court said, "The trial court further determined that Mrs. Moore's
employment and stable income constituted a substantial change in material circumstances
However, the court m its own findings makes clear that this circumstance was also
contemplated at the time the decree was entered

" Id at 1056 The court went on to say

The fact that Mrs Moore presently has a stable income cannot be considered a
change of circumstances The parties obviously contemplated that Mrs Moore
would earn approximately $1,300 at the time the divorce decree was entered
Mrs Moore's stable level of income was anticipated at the time of the divorce
when the original alimony award was set Thus, the court incorrectly
determined that Mrs Moore's present, stable income was a substantial change
m her material circumstances
In sum, the court's findings do not support a determination that a substantial change in
material circumstances not contemplated at the time of the entry of the original decree

has occurred. We therefore reverse the court's determination of a substantial change
in circumstances and remand for a reinstatement of the original $1050 alimony award.
Id. at 1056.
The case at bar is similar in that the parties obviously knew the Plaintiffs employment
was going to terminate in May and knew his income would change. This event was
anticipated and contemplated by the parties yet they did not take account of this in setting the
alimony.
6.

In addition, the court in Moore faced an issue of child support. The divorce

decree said that the child support obligation ceased when the children reached majority. Mr.
Moore petitioned to terminate the alimony obligation because the children had all become
emancipated and Mrs. Moore had a stable income. The Utah Court of Appeals did not reach
the merits of whether a child reaching majority constituted a substantial change in
circumstances saying, "It was certainly a circumstance that was contemplated at the time the
decree was entered." Id. at 1055. This court therefore does not decide if the change in
Defendants income is a substantial, material change in circumstances as this change was
undoubtedly contemplated at the time the divorce decree was entered.
7.

For the above stated reasons, the Court finds no grounds for modification of the

divorce decree based on changed circumstances contemplated at the time the divorce decree
was entered. The divorce decree explicitly refers to the fact the Defendant would lose his
income from Intermountain Farmers. Therefore, this Court cannot now alter the decree.
8.

Each party is to pay their own attorney's fees and costs in this matter.

9.

Attorney for Plaintiff is to prepare an Order in accordance with the above

Memorandum Decision, and submit it to the Court for signature.

Dated this

day of November, 1996.
BY THE COURT:

HOWARD HNMAJ&FANI
District Court Judge

cc:
Rosemond Blakelock, Esq.
Don R. Petersen, Esq.

APPENDIX "C"
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
(R. 103-96)
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DON R. PETERSEN (2576), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

Our File No. 22,905

Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JULIETTE TURLEY,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,

^Ui:27i/^

vs.

Case No. 94440002"
Judge Howard H. Maetani

ROBERT WALTERS TURLEY,
Defendant.
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on December 14, 1995. The
plaintiff appeared in person and was represented by her attorney, Rosemond Blakelock; the
defendant appeared in person and was represented by his attorney, Don R. Petersen. The parties
entered into a stipulation, which was presented to the Court and approved. The Court being
fully advised in the premises, now makes and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The plaintiff and defendant were married on May 31, 1967, in Salt Lake City,

Salt Lake County, Utah.

2o

During the course of the marriage, the parties have experienced irreconcilable

differences making it impossible for them to continue their marriage relationship.

3.

The parties have two minor children, to-wit: Christine Turley, born March 6,

1979; and Brian Judd Turley, born January 14, 1982.
4.

The plaintiff and defendant are both responsible individuals fit to be awarded

the care, custody and control of the minor children of the parties. It is, therefore, reasonable
and proper that the plaintiff and defendant be awarded joint custody of the minor children, with
the plaintiff being awarded residential and physical custody of the children and the defendant
being awarded reasonable rights of visitation.
5.

It is reasonable and proper that the defendant pay to the plaintiff child support

in the sum of $1,300.00 per month for support and maintenance of the two minor children.
Child support shall continue until the minor children reach the age of 18 years or graduate from
high school with their normal matriculated class, whichever occurs last. Support payments shall
be made by automatically transferring funds from the defendant's bank account to Zions First
National Bank, 2100 South 900 West, Salt Lake City, Utah, account number 07346943, into
plaintiffs bank account at Bank of American Fork, Alpine Branch, Alpine, Utah, account
number 0186452; $650.00 on the 5th day of each month and $650.00 on the 20th day of each
month.
6.

It is reasonable and proper that the defendant pay to the plaintiff alimony in the

sum of $1,500.00 per month for the plaintiffs support and maintenance.
2

7.

The defendant has represented to the Court that his income with Intermountain

Farmers will terminate on May 31, 1996, at which time he will no longer receive income from
Intermountain Farmers; however, it is reasonable that in the event the defendant's income does
not terminate, the amounts paid for child support and alimony shall continue as set forth above.
In the event the defendant's income, which has historically been $181,000.00 per year, should
be that amount, and whether he is employed with Intermountain Farmers Association or any
other company, or has income in said amount, then alimony paid by the defendant to the plaintiff
shall increase in the amount that child support decreases when the minor children reach their
majority, but only so long as the defendant's income is based upon historical earnings of
$181,000.00 per year.
8.

It is reasonable and proper that the plaintiff be awarded all right, title and

interest in and to the family home of the parties located at approximately 1221 North Grove
Drive, Alpine, Utah, subject to the obligation owed thereon to Lomas Mortgage Company in the
approximate amount of $20,000.00, which obligation the plaintiff shall assume and shall hold
the defendant harmless therefrom. Said property consists of a home and approximately 1.1
acres. Subject to an easement on the south side of the property in favor of the defendant or his
successors in interest by which to gain access to the barn and property located thereon, said
access shall be 24 feet in width. The defendant shall forthwith execute a quit claim deed
conveying his interest in said property to the plaintiff.
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9.

It is reasonable and proper that the plaintiff be awarded all right, title and

interest in and to a cabin in which the parties have an interest located in proximity to the Smith
Moorehouse Reservoir in Summit County, Utah.
10.

It is reasonable and proper that the defendant be awarded approximately 3.89

acres of property located on the east and west sides of the home property awarded to the
plaintiff. The property shall be subject to an easement on behalf of the plaintiff which will allow
the plaintiff and her successors in interest to traverse over and obtain access to the plaintiffs
property. It is further reasonable and proper that the defendant may develop or sell the property
awarded to him, but he will not live on the property in the event a home is built on the property.
The dimensions of the easement are the road as presently used and occupied.
11.

It is reasonable and proper that the defendant be awarded all right, title and

interest in and to the Fountain Green property consisting of approximately 6.80 acres.
12.

It is reasonable and proper that the defendant be awarded all right, title and

interest in the real property located in Mexico.
13.

It is reasonable and proper that the defendant be awarded all right, title and

interest in and to the retirement plan he has accumulated at his place of employment,
Intermountam Farmers Association, commonly known as Intermountam Farmers Association
401K Retirement Plan.
14.

It is reasonable and proper that the defendant be awarded all right, title and

interest in and to the radio station with call letters KTUR, consisting of stock, real property and
4

personal property. The defendant shall assume all obligations associated with said radio station
and hold the plaintiff harmless therefrom.
15.

It is understood that some or all of the real property being awarded to the

plaintiff and the defendant may be held in a family trust. The plaintiff and defendant shall direct
the trustee of the trust to take all actions necessary so the properties are divided as set forth
herein.
16.

It is reasonable and proper that the plaintiff assume the following debts and

obligations and shall hold the defendant harmless therefrom:

Discover credit card in the

approximate amount of $2,000.00; MasterCard in the approximate amount of $2,000.00; and
Visa credit card in the approximate amount of $2,000.00, held in her name.
17.

It is reasonable and proper that the defendant pay to the plaintiff the sum of

$1,000.00 for attorney fees, said sum to be paid on or before May 31, 1996.
18.

It is reasonable and proper that the defendant pay to the accounting firm of

Hawkins, Cloward & Simister the sum of $300.00 towards fees incurred by said accounting
firm. It is understood that the defendant has heretofore paid to said accounting firm the sum of
$2,400.00.
19.

It is reasonable and proper that the defendant assume the following obligations

and shall hold the plaintiff harmless therefrom: attorney fees incurred with the firm of Howard,
Lewis & Petersen; James Knell, orthodontist, in the approximate amount of $3,200.00; Zions
Bank MasterCard in the approximate amount of $3,944.00; Zions Bank line of credit in the
5

approximate amount of $100,000.00; IFA Credit Union in the approximate amount of
$30,000.00; GM MasterCard in the approximate amount of $8,413.00; Nations Bank Visa in
the approximate amount of $7,906.00; Zions Bank Visa in the approximate amount of
$14,969.00; 401K loan payment in the approximate amount of $20,000.00; Park Leasing in the
approximate amount of $90,000.00; Howard Braun in the approximate amount of $12,500.00;
Contractors Leasing in the approximate amount of $96,000.00; C. F. Turley in the approximate
amount of $165,000.00; radio station operating debt in the approximate amount of $47,500.00;
Jones Waldo law firm in the approximate amount of $3,000.00; and First Security Bank Leasing
in the approximate amount of $9,000.00.
20.

In the event there are other debts incurred by either the plaintiff or the

defendant which are not set forth herein, each party shall pay for the debt that they have
incurred.
21.

Each party shall be awarded the personal property now in their possession,

except for a grandfather clock which shall be delivered to the defendant, as well as a musical
encyclopedia with records, which shall be delivered to the defendant when the children are no
longer residing in the home and not using the same for piano lessons, and the Encyclopedia
Britannica which shall be delivered to the defendant when the children are no longer residing
in the home. The defendant shall further be awarded his musical records, consisting of both
Spanish and English, and his personal paraphernalia located on the premises awarded to the
plaintiff.
6

22.

It is reasonable and proper that with respect to life insurance policies held in

the names of the parties, said policies shall be kept in full force and effect with the minor
children designated as beneficiaries. At such time as the children are no longer minors, the
parties shall be free to do with the policies as they see fit. For the policies on which the
plaintiff is designated the owner, she may designate new beneficiaries when the children are no
longer minors; for the policies on which the defendant is designated the owner, he may designate
new beneficiaries when the children are no longer minors. It is understood that there is a policy
insuring the defendant's life through Intermountain Farmers Association, which is owned by
Intermountain Farmers Association, and that International Farmers Association may terminate
said policy at any time it desires. Each party shall take physical possession of the policies on
which they are designated as owner.
23.

It is reasonable and proper that the defendant maintain health insurance through

his employer so long as it is available at a reasonable cost. Any medical expenses incurred on
behalf of the minor children which are not paid for by insurance shall be paid 50% by the
plaintiff and 50% by the defendant.
24.

It is reasonable and proper that the plaintiff be awarded the 1986 GMC

Suburban and the 1989 Oldsmobile Cutlass. At such time as the 1986 GMC Suburban and the
1989 Oldsmobile Cutlass are paid for, title shall be delivered forthwith to the plaintiff. Until
the obligations are satisfied, the defendant shall pay for the vehicle insurance.

7

25.

It is reasonable and proper that the defendant be awarded the 1988 Chevrolet

pickup truck and the 1986 Buick automobile.
26.

It is reasonable and proper that each party will execute such deeds and

documents necessary to implement the terms of the orders of the Court.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The plaintiff is entitled to a decree of divorce divorcing her from the defendant,

said decree to become final and absolute upon signing and filing of the same in the office of the
Clerk of the Court.
2.

The plaintiff and defendant are entitled to judgment consistent with the

foregoing Findings of Fact.
DATED this *7 day of February, 1996.
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Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JULIETTE TURLEY,
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Plaintiff,
Case No.-91440002Judge Howard H. Maetani

vs.
ROBERT WALTERS TURLEY,
Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on December 14, 1995. The
plaintiff appeared in person and was represented by her attorney, Rosemond Blakelock; the
defendant appeared in person and was represented by his attorney, Don R. Petersen. The parties
entered into a stipulation, which was presented to the Court and approved. The Court having
heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and being fully advised in the
premises, now makes and enters the following:
DECREE OF DIVORCE
1.

The plaintiff is awarded a decree of divorce divorcing her from the defendant,

which decree shall become final and absolute upon signing and filing of the same in the office
of the Clerk of the Court.

2.

The plaintiff and defendant are hereby awarded joint custody of the minor

children of the parties, to-wit: Christine Turley, born March 6, 1979; and Brian Judd Turley,
born January 14, 1982, with the plaintiff being awarded residential and physical custody of the
children and the defendant being awarded reasonable rights of visitation.
3.

The defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff child support in the sum of

$1,300.00 per month for support and maintenance of the two minor children. Said sum shall
be paid in semi-monthly installments of $650.00 each to be paid on the 5th and 20th days of
each month, beginning on the 5th day of January, 1996. Child support shall continue until the
minor children reach the age of 18 years or graduate from high school with their normal
matriculated class, whichever occurs last.
4.

The defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff alimony in the sum of $ 1,500.00

per month for the plaintiffs support and maintenance. Said sum shall be paid in semi-monthly
installments of $750.00 each to be paid on the 5th and 20th days of each month, beginning on
the 5th day of January, 1996.
5.

The provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 62A-11-401 are not implemented at this

time, provided all payments for child support and alimony are taken directly from the
defendant's checking account automatically and deposited into a checking account designated by
the plaintiff. Payments for child support and alimony shall be made by automatic transfer from
the defendant's bank account at Zions First National Bank, 2100 South 900 West, Salt Lake
City, Utah, account number 07346943, into plaintiffs bank account at Bank of American Fork,
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Alpine Branch, Alpine, Utah, account number 0186452; $650.00 on the 5th day of each month
and $650.00 on the 20th day of each month.
6.

The defendant is granted the right to claim the minor children for income tax

exemptions.
7.

The defendant's income from Intermountain Farmers will terminate on May 31,

1996, at which time he will no longer receive income from Intermountain Farmers; however,
in the event the defendant's income does not terminate, the amounts paid for child support shall
continue as set forth above. With respect to alimony, alimony shall increase in the amount that
child support decreases when the minor children reach their majority, only so long as the
defendant's income is based upon historical earnings of $181,000.00 per year.
8.

The plaintiff is awarded all right, title and interest in and to the family home

of the parties located at approximately 1221 North Grove Drive, Alpine, Utah, subject to the
obligation owed thereon to Lomas Mortgage Company in the approximate amount of
$20,000.00, which obligation the plaintiff is ordered to assume and hold the defendant harmless
therefrom. The defendant is ordered to execute a quit claim deed in favor of the plaintiff. Said
property consists of a home and approximately 1.1 acres, subject to an easement on the south
side of the property in favor of the defendant or his successors in interest by which to gain
access to the barn and property located thereon, said access being 24 feet in width, which
property is awarded to the defendant. The defendant is ordered to forthwith execute a quit claim
deed conveying his interest in said property to the plaintiff.
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9.

The plaintiff is awarded all right, title and interest in and to a cabin in which

the parties have an interest located in proximity to the Smith Moorehouse Reservoir in Summit
County, Utah. The defendant is ordered to execute a quit claim deed in favor of the plaintiff.
10.

The defendant is awarded all right, title and interest in and to approximately

3.89 acres of property located on the east and west sides of the home property awarded to the
plaintiff. The plaintiff is ordered to execute a quit claim deed conveying her right, title and
interest in said property to the defendant. The defendant's 3.89 acres of property shall be
subject to an easement in favor of the plaintiff which will allow the plaintiff and her successors
in interest to traverse over and obtain access to the plaintiffs property. The defendant may
develop or sell the property awarded to him, but he will not live on the property in the event
a home is built on the property. The dimensions of the easement are the road as presently used
and occupied* The plaintiff is ordered to execute a quit claim deed conveying her interest in the
said property to the defendant.
11.

The defendant is awarded all right, title and interest in and to the Fountain

Green property consisting of approximately 6.80 acres. The plaintiff is ordered to execute a quit
claim deed conveying her interest in the said property to the defendant.
12.

The defendant is awarded all right, title and interest in the real property located

in Mexico.

4

13.

The defendant is awarded all right, title and interest in and to the retirement

plan he has accumulated at his place of employment, Intermountain Farmers Association,
commonly known as Intermountain Farmers Association 40IK Retirement Plan.
14.

The defendant is awarded all right, title and interest in and to the radio station

with call letters KTUR, consisting of stock, real property and personal property. The defendant
is ordered to assume all obligations incurred in connection with the radio station and to hold the
plaintiff harmless therefrom.
15.

The plaintiff is ordered to assume the following debts and obligations and to

hold the defendant harmless therefrom: Lomas Mortgage Company in the approximate amount
of $20,000.00; Discover credit card in the approximate amount of $2,000.00; MasterCard in the
approximate amount of $2,000.00; and Visa credit card in the approximate amount of $2,000.00.
16.

The defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiffs counsel the sum of $1,000.00

for attorney fees, said sum to be paid on or before May 31, 1996.
17.

The defendant is ordered to pay to the accounting firm of Hawkins, Cloward

& Simister the sum of $300.00 towards fees incurred by said accounting firm.
18.

The defendant is ordered to assume the following obligations and to hold the

plaintiff harmless therefrom: attorney fees incurred with the firm of Howard, Lewis & Petersen;
James Knell, orthodontist, in the approximate amount of $3,200.00; Zions Bank MasterCard in
the approximate amount of $3,944.00; Zions Bank line of credit in the approximate amount of
$100,000.00; IFA Credit Union in the approximate amount of $30,000.00; GM MasterCard in
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the approximate amount of $8,413.00; Nations Bank Visa in the approximate amount of
$7,906.00; Zions Bank Visa in the approximate amount of $14,969.00; 401K loan payment in
the approximate amount of $20,000.00; Park Leasing in the approximate amount of $90,000.00;
Howard Braun in the approximate amount of $12,500.00; Contractors Leasing in the
approximate amount of $96,000.00; C. F. Turley in the approximate amount of $165,000.00;
radio station operating debt in the approximate amount of $47,500.00; Jones Waldo law firm
in the approximate amount of $3,000.00; and First Security Bank Leasing in the approximate
amount of $9,000.00.
19.

In the event there are other debts incurred by either the plaintiff or the

defendant which are not set forth herein, each party is ordered to pay for the debt that they have
incurred.
20.

Each party is awarded the personal property now in their possession, except for

a grandfather clock and a musical encyclopedia with records, which are awarded to the defendant
and shall be delivered to the defendant when minor children are no longer residing in the home
or not using the same for piano lessons, together with the Encyclopedia Britannica, which shall
be delivered to the defendant when minor children are no longer residing in the home. The
defendant is further awarded his musical records, consisting of both Spanish and English, and
his personal paraphernalia located on the premises awarded to the plaintiff.
21.

With respect to life insurance policies held in the names of the parties, said

policies shall be kept in full force and effect with the minor children designated as beneficiaries.
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At such time as the children are no longer minors, the parties shall be free to do with the
policies as they see fit. For the policies on which the plaintiff is designated the owner, she may
designate new beneficiaries when the children are no longer minors; for the policies on which
the defendant is designated the owner, he may designate new beneficiaries when the children are
no longer minors. It is understood that there is a policy insuring the defendant's life through
Intermountain Farmers Association, which is owned by Intermountain Farmers Association, and
that it may terminate said policy at any time it desires. Each party is awarded physical
possession of the life insurance policies on which they are designated as the owner.
22.

The defendant is ordered to maintain health insurance through his employer so

long as it is available at a reasonable cost. Any medical expenses incurred on behalf of the
minor children which are not paid for by insurance will be paid 50% by the plaintiff and 50%
by the defendant. In the event the plaintiff desires to obtain health insurance through any
existing COBRA plans, the defendant shall cooperate in executing such documents so that the
plaintiff may obtain coverage, which shall be maintained at plaintiffs expense.
23.

The plaintiff is awarded the 1986 GMC Suburban and the 1989 Oldsmobile

Cutlass. At such time as the obligations owed on the 1986 GMC Suburban and the 1989
Oldsmobile Cutlass are satisfied, titles to those vehicles shall be delivered to the plaintiff. Until
the obligations are satisfied, the defendant shall pay for the vehicle insurance.
24.

The defendant is awarded the 1988 Chevrolet pickup truck and 1986 Buick

automobile.
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25.

Each party is ordered to execute such deeds and documents necessary to

implement the terms of this Decree of Divorce.
DATED this

7

day of January jffifr.
BY THE COURT V£J£.**.

APPROVED AS TO FOR

ROSAMOND BLAKELOCK, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff
J:\DRP\TURLEY.DEC
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